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The paper analyzes the role of the banking system in the international transmission
of nancial shocks. A channel of transmission is dened as a mechanism through which a
nancial crisis in one country brings about a nancial crisis in another country. Channels
involving the banking sector operate through changes in the value of collateral and capital
adequacy ratios, through bank runs and bank panics, and through moral hazard. Some stylized
facts related to these channels are presented. In particular, the importance of the exposure to
a common source of funding and the irrelevance of bank runs as causes of nancial distress
and contagion are also conrmed by many recent empirical studies. By contrast, according to
empirical analyses, the presence of public guarantees as a source of vulnerability to nancial
shocks is still very controversial. Hence, vulnerability to the common lender channel during
the Mexican, Asian and Russian crises is assessed. The indexes proposed in the paper show
that the risks stemming from this channel have sharply declined in the years following each
crisis for almost all the countries in our sample.
JEL classication: F42, G21, G28.
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1
Analysis of banking and currency crises from a unied perspective is a very recent
development. The literature on ‘twin crises’ has revealed the important complementarities
between bank insolvency and currency instability, stressing that causation may run in either
direction. In the last few years, empirical studies have focused on the relevance of imbalances
in the banking sector at the root of currency devaluations. At the same time, the literature
on currency crises has examined the tendency of nancial crises originating in one country to
spreadtoothersinternationally. Thislineofresearch, usuallyreferredtoas‘contagion’studies,
has just started to disentangle the specic role of banks in the international transmission of
shocks. Aseminalcontributionby Miller(1998)provides examplesofdomesticbanking crises
causing nancial distress abroad, and currency crises abroad provoking domestic bank runs.
 	 

canbedened asa mechanismthrough whichanancialcrisis
in a country A brings about a nancial crisis in a country B. For example, a currency crisis in
A might cause a sharp decline in its imports from B which, in turn, could bring B’s exchange
rate under pressure. Eventually, B too faces a currency crisis (the so called trade channel).
In this paper we are concerned with channels operating through the banking system, which
may be in A, in B or in a third country C. We focus on channels in which banks are involved
because we believe that the banking system has specic characteristics that have to be taken
into account when designing policies aimed at containing systemic risks. Unlike other authors,
we do not distinguish between crises due to the 
 
 between countries A








since we are interested only in the  	 .
2 We also neglect transmission channels based
on optimal portfolio rules even if the banking sector is directly involved. In today’s globally
4 This is a substantial revision of “Crises and Contagion: the Role of the Banking System”. The paper
was written in the context of a research project in the International Sector of the Research Department of the
Bank of Italy on “The international transmission of crises”, coordinated by Prof. Giancarlo Corsetti of the
University of Rome III. We are very grateful to Chiara Bentivogli, Paola Caselli, Giancarlo Corsetti, Giorgio
Gobbi, Aviram Levy, Roberto Rinaldi and seminar participants at the Bank for International Settlements (Oc-
tober 2000), the Bank of Italy (February 2001) and the International Atlantic Economic Conference (March
2001) for useful suggestions and helpful discussions. We also thank Antonio Covelli and Giovanna Poggi for
valuable research assistance. This paper does not necessarily reect the views of the Bank of Italy. Email: sbra-
cia.massimo@insedia.interbusiness.it zaghini.andrea@insedia.interbusiness.it.
5 In two related papers, Pericoli and Sbracia (2001) and Corsetti et al. (2001) provide a theoretical appraisal
of studies on contagion and interdependence and an empirical analysis of the occurrence of contagion during the
Asian crisis.8
integrated world, banks invest in international nancial markets and, like other institutional
investors, can transmit shocks through portfolio rebalancing decisions. However, this channel
is not bank-specic. Here, we analyze transmission mechanisms deriving from changes in
the value of collateral and capital adequacy ratios, from bank runs and bank panics, and from
moral hazard.
The rst channel stems from the specic lending function of banks. Loan contracts
typically require the borrower to provide 
. If a currency crisis reduces the market
value of stocks in a country, each economy that has been backing its liabilities with those
stocks as collateral has to ‘mark to market’ otherwise, it may face a reduction in its credit
lines from the banking system. Moreover, if a bank has been lending to rms in the crisis
country, the resulting rise in non-performing loans worsens its ‘value at risk’. The result is that
the bank, in order to comply with binding 
  

, will have to withdraw
capital from other countries, creating a credit crunch. The larger the number of countries for




The second channel of transmission relates to the function of transforming maturities.
Banks transform instruments with short maturities, offered to depositors, into instruments with
long maturities that other agents desire. This ‘transformation’ service leaves banks vulnerable
to runs that can potentiallybe transmitted to the wholedomesticbanking system ( ).
In models with multiple equilibria, as in the seminal paper by Diamond and Dybvig (1983),





 available to all agents. On the other hand, in models were the multiplicity






In order to reduce the risk of runs, public authorities may offer guarantees on deposits.
  resulting from implicit or explicit government guarantees, condence in
internationalrescuepackagesorthebeliefthatsomeborrowersare‘toobigtofail’cangenerate
excessive capital inows that banks may channel towards risky or unprotable plans. Such
overborrowing, in turn, can translate into unsustainable imbalances that make the economy
vulnerable to international shocks and to a sudden reversal of capital ows.9
Among the channels discussed in the paper, we regard the presence of a common lender
as the most important source of vulnerability. This view is induced by the growing empirical
literature on the topic, which points to the signicant effects of this channel on the probability
of a nancial crisis, while mitigating the role of bank runs and remaining inconclusive about
moral hazard. Thus, we propose some indexes of vulnerability to the common lender channel,
which take into account both the borrower’s dependence and the lender’s exposure.
In the next section, we offer a theoretical examination of the channels that favor the
transmission of nancial shocks through the banking system. In section 3, we present some
stylized facts related to these channels. Notable points here are: the concentration of loans
and the presence of a common lender in the regions involved in the major crises of the
second half of the 1990s the apparent irrelevance of episodes of bank panics during the last
twenty years the recent widespread diffusion of explicit deposit insurance. In section 4 we
discuss the relevance of the different channels of transmission in the light of recent empirical
studies. Section 5 proposes some indexes of vulnerability to contagion stemming from the
concentration of loans from the same lender. Section 6 concludes.
  !" # $% !&
2.1 

   
  	 

In the current scenario of growing cross-border integration among banks, a common
lender can be the main source of funds for several countries. But competition for funds from
the same bank can become a problem. When a common lender is highly exposed to a crisis
country, adjustments to restore capital adequacy or reduce risk exposure can lead to sudden
cuts of credit lines in other economies. In fact, if a bank faces a rise in non-performing
loans in one country, it is likely to reduce its overall value at risk, either by choice or for
regulation reasons. In practice, it may shift away from lending and increase its holding of
government bonds, so that other countries that had been borrowing from it become vulnerable
to a retrenchment of their credit line. Moreover, if these countries’ liabilities have a short
maturity and the bank’s rebalancing needs are large, the crisis can trigger large capital outows
from other countries. For instance, consider the case in which the rms from two countries
A and B borrow from the same banking system (say, country C). When a crisis hits A, banks
from C may face defaults on loans to A. To restore capital adequacy ratios, country C can
provoke a credit crunch in country B by calling in the loans. Thus, the productive sector of10
country B comes under pressure and eventually the whole country may face a crisis. Note that
even if B’s economy is not directly linked to A’s, the presence of a third party C allows the
crisis to spread from one country to the other.
When borrowers are heavily dependent on a bank and have no easy access to
alternative sources of nancing, the credit crunch can also cause a crisis in other economies,
independently of the state of fundamentals. However, three conditions must be fullled for
this channel of transmission to operate:
– the bank’s exposure in the country initially affected by a nancial crisis must be large,
implying potential substantial losses and, in turn, the need to restore capital asset ratios or
to readjust risk exposure
– the same bank must be an important source of credit for other countries
– the potentially affected countries must not have other sources of funding readily available.
Note that the third condition relies on some form of market imperfection. If the common
lender does not roll over its loans in countries with sound fundamentals, other lenders could
intervene in its place. However, the common lender might have had a better knowledge of
the borrowers’ economies, given their past relationship or because of geographical proximity.
Since potential lenders may not be able to monitor their borrowers efciently, owing, for
instance, to larger early costs, they might refrain from replacing the common lender.
A similar pattern of contagion is also at work through changes in the value of collateral
(e.g. stocks or government bonds) provided by borrowers. If the value of these assets falls
after a nancial crisis, banks will demand that the value of collateral be restored. When rms
in country B provide collateral from country A and a crisis hits the latter, the banking system
(now in country B) requires them to adjust the value of collateral otherwise banks have to
reduce the amount of their outstanding loans. As before, a credit crunch in country B and the
transmission of the crisis (from A to B) are the likely outcomes.
Emerging economies, which require substantial foreign resources to nance productive
activities, are particularly vulnerable to changes in the value of collateral. In fact, weak
international nancial links, reected in inadequate provision of international collateral, place
limits on a country’s ability to acquire external nancing (Caballero and Krishnamuthy, 1999).
For instance, consider a region that is economically open but has an underdeveloped bank-11
based nancial market, and suppose that an economy in this region backs its funding by asset
holdings in a neighboring country. When a crisis hits the ‘collateral’ economy, the lender will
require a sounder backing of its claims. If this is impossible, the lender will downgrade the
borrower and reduce the amount of credit issued, ceasing to roll over existing loans or calling
in its credits. Consequently, during nancial crises the country’s international collateral may
prove insufcient to nance its productive activity. Domestic rms requiring foreign funds
might trade domestic assets for international collateral at prices below those warranted by the
fundamentals of the country, exacerbating the initial shock.




The traditional explanation for a bank run is that depositors seeing large withdrawals




 basis, when depositors expect a run, they respond by rushing to
withdraw, in an attempt to precede other depositors. Withdrawals in excess of banks’ current
expected demand for liquidity can cause bankruptcy. In fact, banks typically transform liquid
liabilities into illiquid assets. This service – which allows better risk sharing among people
with different consumption horizons (and provides the rationale for the existence of banks) –
makes banks vulnerable to runs. Bank run models, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), exhibit
multiple equilibria: a good equilibrium, which entails optimal risk sharing, and a bank run
equilibrium, which makes all agents worse off with respect to the allocation that they would
have achieved without bank intermediation (i.e., by trading in a competitive market).
Anapparent inconsistencyofthestandard modelisthatbankrunsshouldnotbeobserved
in equilibrium, because no one would deposit when a bank run is expected. However, the
equilibrium could be selected contingently on a publicly observable random variable, provided
that the probability of a run is small. As Diamond and Dybvig put it:
‘this [variable] could be a bad earnings report, a commonly observed run at
some other bank, a negative government forecast, or even a sunspot. It need not be
anything fundamental about the bank’s condition’.
Bank runs have drawn the attention of economists and regulators because a run on
an ‘illiquid’ but solvent bank entails an inefcient equilibrium. Different classes of models12
provide different explanations for the causes of this market failure and prescribe different
optimal policies for preventing the problem. In the framework of Diamond and Dybvig, bank
runs arise because of a 
 
: depositors withdraw simply because they expect
other depositors to withdraw and, by doing so, they determine a (self-fullling) bankruptcy. In
this model, the optimal public policy is the implementation of a deposit insurance scheme
nanced with money creation. In other models (e.g. Chari and Jagannathan, 1988) the





: depositors are afraid that
banks are insolvent, because they do not know the real state of banks’ claims (and banks
cannot credibly reveal it). Hence, a public policy should aim at reducing the informational
asymmetries. In this perspective, Gorton (1985a) shows that a temporary ‘suspension of
convertibility’ (of the demand deposit into cash) could give banks the possibility of informing
depositors that continuation of investments is mutually benecial.
3
Bank run models highlight several possible causes of the international transmission of
nancial shocks. First, a currency or a banking crisis in one country may represent the sunspot
variable that triggers a bank run (or an extensive bank panic) in another country. While
this channel is very clear at a theoretical level, it is very hard – if not impossible – to test
on empirical grounds. The crucial issue is that multiple-equilibria models of bank runs and
contagion are not reproducible, and there exists no econometric methodology to test them.
Second, the revision ofbeliefs following a crisis in another country may beanothercause
of the transmission. If agents observe widespread episodes of bankruptcy, they may interpret
these as a signal of difculties affecting the world economy. The resulting Bayesian update
of the quality of banks’ assets can trigger a sequence of withdrawals and failures. Even if the
transmission of shocks through this channel is moreclosely related to the fundamentals, it does
not always lead to efcient outcomes. In particular, Chari and Jagannathan (1988) show that
agents can (mis)interpret liquidity withdrawals, considering them as generated by pessimistic
information about banks’ assets, and their reaction can cause a bank panic.
Finally, contagious bank runs can occur in the presence of asymmetric information.
In a recent model of bank panics, Chen (1999) modies Diamond and Dybvig’s standard
6 Other authors consider as excessive ‘the anxiety’ of bank executives and regulators for this phenomenon
and for its implications in terms of systemic risk. Hence – also in the light of past experiences in Scotland and
New England (the Suffolk System) – they claim that banks should not be regulated at all (see, for instance, the
discussions in Fama, 1980 Gorton, 1985b Kaufman, 1994 Calomiris and Kahn, 1996).13
framework by assuming that some depositors are better informed about the value of bank’s
assets. Informed depositors enjoy an advantage, since they can withdraw earlier in bad states
in which the bank cannot fully repay all depositors. Uninformed depositors therefore have an
incentive to respond to other sources of information, before the value of the bank’s assets is
revealed. Failures of other banks, interpreted as a signal of worldwide (or regional) difculties,
can be one such source of information. Even if information contained in bank failures is very
noisy, uninformed depositors may still respond to it and withdraw. Moreover, informed agents,
knowing that uninformed depositors withdraw early, can be forced to withdraw early too, even
before they receive more precise signals about the assets. In this way, a single bankruptcy can




The literature on bank runs has produced interesting developments of the original model
of Diamond and Dybvig in which a unique equilibrium emerges. In particular, Postlewaite and
Vives (1987) have presented a framework in which there is a unique equilibrium that entails a
positive probability of a bank run. In their model there is no exogenous event on which agents
condition their behavior and, at the same time, there are  equilibria without the possibility
of bank runs. An important feature of this kind of model is the possibility of making some
comparative statics, relating the probability of a run to the characteristics of the economy.
Building on a variation of the model of Postlewaite and Vives, Goldfajn and Valdes
(1997) focus on the role of banks as intermediaries between foreign investors and domestic
enterprises. The banking system typically offers foreign investors assets with shorter maturity,
which attract   
 !". This intermediation has two main consequences: it results
in larger capital movements and, at the same time, it increases the risk of sudden reversals
of ows. In fact, the effects of internal or external shocks are amplied by the action of the
domestic banking system and propagated to the rest of the economy. When a shock hits the
economy (e.g., a negative productivity shock or a rise in international interest rates), risk-
averse foreign investors, holding shorter-term assets, withdraw their funds. In this framework
the banking system clearly increases the vulnerability of the country to contagion: shocks
(such as a currency crisis abroad), that without intermediation would have resulted only in14
relatively small capital outows, can set on a disruptive nancial crisis. Moreover, assets with
shorter maturity imply larger capital inows and, in turn, a higher probability of a run.
4
Goldfajn and Valdes extend their analysis by including in the model a central bank
and the possibility of a currency mismatch between assets and liabilities of the domestic
banking system. If domestic banks nd it optimal to offer (liquid) foreign-currency-
denominated assets, the mismatch with their (illiquid) domestic-currency-denominated
investments translates into a higher probability of runs. When a run on domestic banks
occurs, the impact of capital outows on ofcial reserves increases the probability of a
currency devaluation. Hence, not only does the model provide an explanation for the recurrent
‘boom-bust’ cycles of capital o w so b s e r v e di nm a n ye m e r g i n gm a r k e t s ,b u ti ta l s op r e s e n t sa
consistent framework in which banking and currency crises occur together.
5
More recently, Goldstein and Pauzner (2000) have solved the coordination problem of
Diamond and Dybvig by introducing some incomplete private information. In their ‘global
game’, a unique probability of a bank run emerges as a function of the characteristics of the







 (i.e. offering a higher return to agents demanding early withdrawal) makes the bank more
vulnerable to a run. Hence, internal or external shocks that have an impact on short-term
interest rates make the occurrence of a nancial crisis more likely.
Finally, contagion may be due to the presence of an international interbank market.
To the extent that interbank loans are neither collateralized nor insured, a bank failure can
generate a chain of subsequent failures. On the one hand, an international interbank market
as well as national interbank markets promotes efcient nancial management,
6 and makes it
possible to limit an individual bank’s troubles. For instance, when a bank is affected by an
idiosyncratic liquidity shock, the interbank market provides liquidity support. On the other
hand, the existence of this market increases the fragility of the whole banking system, since it
cannot provide enough liquidity when the entire sector comes under pressure.
7 In a similar context, Chang and Velasco (1998) have proved that larger capital inows increase the level
of indebtedness of the banking system and hence the vulnerability of the country to a bank run triggered by a
refusal of creditors to roll over their loans.
8 For an extensive empirical analysis on the ‘twin crises’ see Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).
9 In particular, the decentralized operation of interbank lending facilitates peer monitoring (Rochet and
Tirole, 1996).15
Freixas et al. (1999b) consider banks facing uncertain liquidity needs. Long-term
investment opportunities make it costly for banks to maintain liquid reserves. Thus, an
interbank credit market where banks can obtain liquidity reduces the opportunity cost of
maintaining liquid reserves. However, in the presence of illiquid investments, international
interbank linkages expose the system to the possibility of a coordination failure, even if all
banks aresolvent. Forinstance, aliquidity shock in a foreign country can lead homedepositors
to believe that home banks will provide their liquidity to that country the best response to this
belief is to withdraw home deposits, thereby generating a bank run at home. In a related paper,
Allen and Gale (2000) show that contagion due to liquidity shocks depends on the degrees
of completeness of the interbank linkages. When a region of the world is hit by a liquidity
shock and world demand for liquidity exceeds world supply, international interbank linkages
can propagate the shock to other regions. The consequences of such contagion turn out to be
very strong if the interbank market is 

 (i.e. each region is connected only with a
few other regions) and are mitigated if the market is 

 (each region is connected with
all the other regions). Finally, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) developed a theoretical model of
‘credit chains’ in which shocks are amplied and transmitted through a network of rms that
borrow from and lend to each other. In such a network, temporary liquidity shocks to some
rms can cause a chain reaction, propelling other rms into nancial difculties.
2.3  
In order to reduce the risk of bank runs, many countries have implemented explicit
deposit insurance schemes. Even in the absence of explicit insurance, international investors
may believe that their deposits and loans in some emerging economies enjoy  	
 public
insurance. As stressed by Diaz-Alejandro (1985), in many cases the public expects policy-
makers to intervene and save depositors and other creditors from losses when nancial
intermediaries run into trouble. Warnings that such interventions will not be provided may
simply appear to be not believable, as expectations of a bail-out are strengthened by past
episodes of capital injections into the banking system.
Like any form of insurance, public guarantees on deposits create moral hazard. Moral
hazard arises when the provision of guarantees modies the incentive for the insured party to





  ) and the decisions of bank managers (
 
 ).
Creditor moral hazard is related to the large capital inows and the reduced incentives for an
effective monitoring on banks’ lending activity induced by the existence of explicit or implicit
insurance on deposits and loans. Debtor moral hazard is connected with the additional risks
taken by bank managers and shareholders in both their borrowing (overborrowing) and their
lending activities. It may also produce an additional negative effect in cases of nancial crises:
ifanegativeshockhits theeconomyandreducesinvestment protability,bankmanagers might
notbecomemorecautiousinplanningtheirinvestments. Onthecontrary, theycouldwellbegin
to nance very risky projects in an attempt to recover their losses ( 
  	 

).
Corsetti et al. (1999) propose a model to explain the role of moral hazard in the
unfolding of the Asian nancial crisis. Their work focuses on moral hazard as the common
sourceofover-investment, excessiveexternalborrowingandcurrentaccountdecit.
7 Financial
intermediation played a key role in channeling funds towards projects that were unprotable
from a social point of view. Because of moral hazard, national banks borrowed excessively
from abroad and lent excessively at home. The production plans and strategies of the corporate
sector largely overlooked the costs and risks of investment projects. Underlying this over-
lending syndrome was the presumption that short-term interbank cross-border liabilities were
effectively guaranteed by either a direct government intervention in favor of international
debtors or an indirect bail-out through IMF programs. To the extent that foreign creditors
were willing to lend against future implicit bail-out revenue, unprotable projects and cash
shortfalls were re-nanced through external borrowing. This process, known as   ,
translated into an unsustainable path of current account decits, leading to overall systemic
fragility and a signicant vulnerability to shocks.
While Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini provide a theoretical framework consistent with the
events observed in each Asian country hit by the crisis, their model does not explain why all
the countries were hit at the same time. One possible explanation is that behaviors that arise
becauseofmoralhazard can behighlycontagious. Moral hazard is, in fact, inherently forward-
looking: a particular episode can create moral hazard only to the extent that it inuences
expectations of how a similar situation will be dealt with in the future. Hence, if foreign
: For an explanation of the ‘over-borrowing syndrome’ see Giannetti (2000).17
creditors suffer losses in a country where public authorities were supposed to grant deposits
and loans, they may also refrain from investing in countries with a similar nancial system. It
is worthrecalling that theeffectsofmoral hazardon bank managers and shareholders are likely
to be negligible in countries with a well-designed and effective system of prudential regulation
and supervision. If a banking crisis in an emerging-market economy reveals information about
the weakness of banking supervision in other countries, banking and currency crises in the
latter countries are likely to occur.
' $ &"( #
In this section we provide some stylized facts describing the recent evolution of
borrowing and lending ows, the occurrence of bank runs and bank panics, and the worldwide
diffusion of deposit insurance schemes.
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Developing countries rely heavily on foreign funds to nance their economic activity.
The United States, Japan and Germany provide most of the foreign loans these countries
demand. Data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) show that at the beginning
of the 1990s loans from these three lenders accounted for over half (53 per cent) the total
liabilities of developing countries vis-à-vis BIS reporting countries.
8 At the end of the decade,
this share was still close to 45 per cent, despite the contraction in Japanese lending.
Following the recent Asian crisis, total loans from advanced economies to developing
countries diminished somewhat. Yet foreign loans originating from the United States, Japan
and Germany remained highly specialized, concentrated in Latin America, Asia and Eastern
Europe, respectively. In 1990, about 60 per cent of US bank loans to developing countries
was directed towards Latin America at the beginning of 2000, despite the decrease in US
total funds to developing countries which followed the Asian crisis, this share was almost
unchanged (57 per cent). A similar pattern characterizes the Japanese banking sector. Loans
by Japanese banks to developing countries decreased sharply after the Asian crisis: in three
years they halved from the peak reached in Q2 1997. Japanese bank loans to Asian and Pacic
; In this paper, we use the BIS denition of developing countries and BIS consolidated data set.18
countries, equal approximately to 50 per cent of their loans to developing countries in 1990,
rose to over 75 per cent in 1994 and remained on that level until 2000.
Unlike the other main lenders, the exposure of Germany to developing countries
increased to some extent after 1997. Over the decade, the weight of East European countries
remained constant, at around 40 per cent of total bank loans to developing countries.
A second feature of bank loans is that developing countries in the same area tend to share
the same borrower. Table 1 shows the shares of indebtedness of Latin America, Asia Pacic
and Eastern Europe vis-à-vis the United States, Japan and Germany in the quarter preceding
the Mexican, Asian and Russian crises and in the latest available quarter.
9
At the end of 1994, most Latin American countries’ liabilities vis-à-vis the United States
were at least 30 per cent of their total external indebtedness (32 per cent for whole area). After
the Mexican crisis, the weight of loans from US banks declined. At the end of June 2000,
the region was still highly indebted to the US: on average, liabilities to the common lender
accounted for almost ￿
e of the total. Similarly, at the end of the second quarter of 1997, more
than 35 per cent of total external liabilities of the Asia Pacic region were due to Japanese
banks. After the crisis, the weight of external liabilities to Japan declined quickly but, in the
second quarter of 2000, it was still signicant at 24 per cent. Finally, Eastern Europe increased
its dependence on German banking loans even after the 1998 Russian crisis. The share of loans
from the common lender rose to almost 40 per cent in mid 2000.
) * ! 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While there seems to be a large consensus on the theoretical denitions of sound and
unsound banking systems, the empirical identication of a banking crisis is not a simple
task. Studies are strongly conditioned by the availability and quality of data, especially for
developing countries, by the difculties in nding homogenous sources of data at the rm
level, andby the lack of high-frequencydata, whichcomplicatesthe taskof promptlydetecting
crises. Most empirical works have dened a banking crisis by considering one or more of the
< Each entry is the amount owed by that region to the lender, divided by that region’s total debt to BIS
reporting countries (Grand Total). For the quarter preceding the Mexican, Asian and Russian crises we refer,
respectively, to Q4 1994, Q2 1997 and Q2 1998. Data for the Q2 1994 (which actually is the closest available
quarter before the beginning of the Mexican crisis) do not differ signicantly from Q4 1994.19
following factors: the ratio of non-performing assets to total assets in the banking system
the closure or failure of important banking institutions the occurrence of major bail-outs,
conducted by the government or the private sector (e.g., through mergers or take-overs)
the occurrence of large-scale nationalizations of banks the cost of rescue operations the
occurrence of extensive bank runs a fall in the prices of bank shares.
Owing in part to those data-related problems, few studies have compared the frequency
of banking crises over long horizons. The relevance of the phenomenon in the last 20 years
is acknowledged in Lindgren et al. (1996), which provides one of the most extensive studies
on banking crises. The authors surveyed all the IMF member countries, from 1980 to 1995.
During that period 133 among the over 180 member countries of the IMF experienced 
or  
 
 in the banking sector.
10 Developing and industrial countries alike were
affected, as well as all economies in transition. Despite the large number of crises, episodes
of bank runs and bank panics have not been frequent. The analysis of a sub-sample of 34
countries that have experienced crises or signicant problems in the banking sector provides a
large set of information on both the causes and the consequences of the crises.
11 The sample
includes only 7 bank panics and ‘sporadic’ bank runs on individual institutions in just a few
other episodes. Moreover, in only 2 cases (Argentina in 1995 and the Philippines in the rst
half of the 1980s) can the bank panic be considered as the main cause of the failure or closure
of some institutions.
The current situation, characterized by relatively infrequent episodes of bank runs,
contrasts with the picture prevailing before widespread resort to deposit insurance. For
instance in the United States, the so called Free Banking Era (1837-63) and National Banking
Era (1863-1914) were punctuated by recurrent nationwide bank panics. Since federal deposit
insurance introduction in 1934, there have been no widespread episodes of bank panic. The
empirical relevance of bank runs as a cause of banking crises is, however, still an open
question. According to some authors, both in recent and in past periods, runs have only been a
symptom of the banks’ weaknesses, rather than the cause. Most banking problems have been
43   is dened as a situation in which a sizable group of nancial institutions has liabilities exceeding
the market value of their assets, the economy experiences bank runs or other portfolio shifts, collapse of some
nancial rms and government intervention. Extensive unsoundness of the banking sector, short of a crisis, is
termed a  
 

44 The sample comprises 19 developing economies, 8 transition economies and 7 industrial countries: 36
cases of banking sector problems are singled out (for one country, Argentina, 3 different episodes are considered).20
duetoa deterioration in asset quality, rather thantobankruns (the liabilities sideof the balance
sheet).
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The IMF has recently conducted an extensive survey of 72 countries with different
systems of deposit protection (see Garcia, 1999). An explicit deposit insurance scheme for
national banks did not exist in the United States before 1934 and other countries did not follow
suit until the 1960s.
12 In April 1999, of the 72 systems reviewed by the IMF, 68 were explicitly
dened in law or regulation. Interestingly, only 18 schemes were adopted before 1980. As the
incidence of banking crises escalated, 50 new formal schemes were implemented: 19 during
the 1980s and 31 during the 1990s.
The acceleration in the implementation of formal deposit insurance schemes was
particularly pronounced in Europe and Africa. The European Union Directive on Deposit
Guarantees in 1994 – which requires countries to set up a deposit insurance scheme to which
banks are obliged to adhere – has induced many countries to revise or to establish systems
of deposit protection. In countries that are, or aspire to be, members of the European Union,
standardization of certain criteria (e.g. the compulsory or voluntary nature of membership and
the coverage limits) has been enhanced. In Africa, the implementation of formal schemes did
not quicken until 1999, when 6 countries (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo,
Equatorial Guineaand Gabon) ratied aTreaty establishing acommon central bank and setting
the rules of an explicit deposit insurance scheme.
The most important trend in deposit insurance seems to be the shift from an implicit
to an explicit scheme. Many countries now with explicit guarantees have, in fact, reformed
their pre-existing implicit insurance. Of the four countries reported in Garcia (1999) that do
not maintain formal guarantees on deposits, only Kuwait has never considered implementing
explicit schemes. In Bolivia and Costa Rica explicit schemes are under discussion or being
45 Some states within the United States started deposit insurance earlier so did Czechoslovakia.21
prepared in Honduras, the current banking law refers to the adoption of a deposit insurance
law, but, in April 1999, the bill had still to be presented to Parliament.
13
Revisions of explicit guarantees have tended towards making it compulsory for banks
to be members of the deposit insurance scheme. These reforms – aimed at reducing adverse
selection problems – have occurred not only in Europe as a result of the 1994 Directive on
Deposit Guarantees, but also in the Middle East and Americas.
14
Generally, deposit insurance covers only retail deposits and only up to a certain amount.
In order to reduce the room for moral hazard, the coverage limit should be low enough to
encourage large depositors and sophisticated creditors (such as foreign creditors and other
banks) to monitor the bank’s investment activity closely on the other hand, the limit should
also be sufciently high to guarantee small depositors, typically unable to engage themselves
in an effective monitoring of banking institutions. As a rule of thumb, the IMF suggests that
deposits should be guaranteed up to alimit not exceeding two times per capita GDP. In the IMF
sample the average coverage limit is 3 times per capita GDP, with the highest average in Africa
and the lowest in Europe. However, some countries offer full coverage to all deposits and also
to other liabilities.
15 Most of these countries began to offer full coverage when they declared a
nancial emergency, intending to shift to limited coverage once the conditions of the banking
system were sounder. For instance, the current insurance scheme in Japan – which covers all
depositors and creditors – is planned to end in March 2002 (see Freixas et al., 1999a). Sweden
and Finland have already withdrawn the full coverage offered during their banking crises and
have replaced it with limited coverage.
Finally, almost all countries with explicit deposit insurance have shifted to a system of
coverage per depositor rather than per deposit, in order to lower the effective coverage ratio
and to discourage attempts to circumvent the limits.
46 Dermirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) consider a different sample, where 23 other economies – mainly
Asian and African countries – still maintain an implicit scheme.
47 A deposit insurance scheme that is voluntary and charges a xed premium is likely to attract weaker
institutions and repel stronger ones.
48 These countries are Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand andTurkey.
Kuwait – which has an implicit scheme – is also supposed to cover all deposits.22
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The stylized facts presented above show that the presence of a common lender
characterizes many developing countries. Moreover, banking crises in these countries –
especially in recent years – have not been associated with bank runs, maybe as a result of the
widespread diffusion of explicit deposit insurance schemes. The importance of the exposure
to a common source of funding and the irrelevance of bank runs as causes of nancial distress
and of crisis transmission across borders are conrmed by empirical studies. By contrast,
according to empirical analyses, the presence of public guarantees as a source of vulnerability
to nancial shocks is still very controversial.
The role of indebtedness to a common creditor as a cause of currency crises during
the last 30 years has been examined by Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000). The authors divide
their sample of 20 industrial and developing countries into 3 different partitions, dictated by
   #

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   (bilateral and third-party) and  	 	 .T h e i r
model shows two important ndings: i) the probability of a currency crisis increases non-
linearly with the number of crisis economies in the same cluster ii) knowing that there is a
crisis in a country belonging to the same common lender group has a higher predictive power
than knowing that the country belongs to the same trade cluster or to the same geographical
cluster.
Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1999) identify a common lender in all recent international
nancial crises: the United States for Latin America in 1994-95, Japan for South-East Asia
in 1997 and a small group of European countries (Germany in particular) for Transition
economies during the 1998 Russian crisis. For all crisis episodes, they label ‘ground zero
country’ the economy where a nancial shock rst occurred and then study the similarity
in the nancial structure of crisis economies with respect to that country. The three ground
zero economies are Mexico, Thailand and Russia. The model shows that the structure of
indebtedness is the most important factor in transmitting nancial shocks across countries. All
the economies that experienced nancial turmoil after the collapse of the ground zero country
had a structure of liabilities similar to that of the rst country experiencing turmoil, suggesting
that competition for funds is signicantly associated with the probability of contagion.
Similar conclusions are also drawn by Caramazza et al. (2000) through a panel probit
model in which one explanatory variable takes into account the source of nancing. This23
variable is built as the product of the importance of the common creditor for the borrowing
country – where the common creditor is identied as the country that lent the most to the
‘ground zero’ country – and the importance of the borrowing country for the common creditor.
On average, the weight of the common lender in the liabilities of a crisis country is about 5
percentage points higher than its weight in the liabilities of unaffected economies, whereas
the weight of a crisis economy in the assets of the common lender is about 10 percentage
points higher than the weight of unaffected countries. As a result, the explanatory variable is
signicantly higher in crisis economies than in non-crisis ones.
With regard to the importance of bank panics, our stylized facts emphasize that in
the last thirty years, aside from a few anecdotal episodes, panics have always been only a
symptom of weaknesses in the nancial system rather than the cause. Although there is not
yet universal consensus on the causes of banking crises, in most countries episodes of nancial
turmoiloccurredinthewakeofasset-relatedproblems, suchasrisingsharesofnon-performing
loans. For instance, Lindgren et al. (1996) nd that banking crises are mainly related to the
uctuations in the conditions of the real sector due to the business cycle. In fact, in the onset
of a banking crisis, many countries experienced a recession, large shifts in terms of trade and
other economic shocks, or important non-economic events with an adverse economic impact.
Generally, these macroeconomic factors contributed to a further deterioration of an already
weak nancial system, characterized by low protability, high debt, low levels of cash and
capital relative to assets, and high responsiveness to changes in domestic and foreign interests
rates.
While in the most recent years the unimportance of bank runs might be due to the
worldwide diffusion of deposit insurance schemes (see Section 3), according to many authors,
even at the beginning of the century, most banking panics did not show the characteristics of
random events, such as equilibria caused by agents’ self-fullling beliefs. Serious problems
in the liabilities side of banks’ balance sheets (e.g. large declines in total deposits) occurred
rarely in the US and were mainly concentrated in two periods: 1893 and 1930-33. However,
such problems were often accompanied by a deteriorating macroeconomic outlook, which
complicates the task of assessing the direction of causality.
An inuential study by Gorton (1988) examines the seven crises that occurred during the
US National Banking Era (1863-1914), before deposit insurance was adopted by the United24
States. The results of his analysis are consistent with the view that such panics were systematic
responses by depositors to a changing perception of risk, usually based on the arrival of new
information, rather than random events. Kaufman (1994), in his review of the episodes of
bank contagion, also argues that strong shocks at one bank or group of banks did not spill
over randomly to other banks. With only rare exceptions, empirical studies focusing on equity
returns on banks in the United States from 1970 to 1990 report strong evidence that contagion
o c c u r r e do n l yf o rt h eb a n k sw h i c hw e r enancially interconnected with the initially affected
bank. For instance, after the failure of the ‘perceived’ state-insured thrift institutions in Ohio
and Maryland in 1985, depositors were able not only to differentiate between federally insured
and federally non-insured institutions, but also to distinguish correctly between ‘perceived’
insured and ‘perceived’ uninsured institutions.
The relationship between bank stability and moral hazard arising from the adoption of
deposit insurance schemes is still very controversial. Dermirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1999
and 2000) argue that explicit deposit insurance increases the probability of a banking crisis and
that its impact tends to be stronger when the coverage offered to depositors is large and the
scheme is funded and run by the government. However, Eichengreen and Arteta (2000), with
a sample covering a longer time period and a larger number of developing countries, show the
oppositeresult: depositinsurancereducestheprobabilityofabankingcrisis. Otherestimations
including also data from OECD countries provide, instead, non-signicant coefcients.
To summarize, the presence of a common lender appears as the most relevant channel of
transmission. Indeed, empirical studies on banking crises nd that vulnerability to contagion
increases substantially when countries borrow heavily from a single source of funding. Thus,
a set of indicators of a nancial system’s weaknesses should take into account the level of
indebtedness vis-à-vis the same lender. Some potential indicators – proposed in the next
section – suggest that vulnerability to contagion through the common-lender channel has
sharply decreased after the Mexican, Asian and Russian crises.
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Inthis section weprovideanassessment ofvulnerabilityto contagionduetothepresence
of a common lender. Our analysis focuses on the three main areas involved in recent episodes
of nancial distress: Latin America, Asia Pacic and East Europe. As discussed above, for25
each of these three regions it is easy to identify a common lender: the United States, Japan and
Germany, respectively.
5.1 "%   % #
The theoretical survey presented in the paper (Section 2) suggests that vulnerability
deriving from a common lender depends on the levels of both the borrower’s liabilities and
the lender’s exposure. For instance, a situation in which many countries borrow heavily from
the same lender is not necessarily risky, provided that the lender’s exposure vis-à-vis each
country is not large. Consider the Mexican crisis. If the share of US external loans vis-à-vis all
Latin American countries had been negligible in 1994, the risk of a sudden reversal of the US
funds following a default in one of these countries would have been small. Instead, US banks
were highly exposed to these countries Mexico alone accounted for almost ￿
e of US external
banking loans to developing countries.
For each emerging country in our set, tables 2 to 4 report two measures of dependence
from the common lender in the crisis year and in the second quarter of 2000: the relative
dependence () and the absolute dependence (). For each country , the former is the ratio
between the amount owed to the common lender and country  total liabilities vis-à-vis BIS
reporting countries. The latter is the ratio between the amount owed to the lender and the GDP

















where 	 stands for common lender, 
 is the set of BIS reporting countries, 	 is the
set of developing countries, ￿
￿ are the liabilities of country  vis-à-vis country .
Tables 2 to 4 show that in 1994 Peru and Paraguay were the only Latin American
countries with a low relative dependence on US bank loans. All the other Latin American
countries were receiving no less than 30 per cent of their banking funding from the United
States. Analogously, in 1997 many economies in the Asia Pacic region were highly
dependent on Japanese banks and in 1998 most East European countries were largely26
borrowing from Germany. The most important exception to this geographical pattern is
represented by the Philippines. Unlike the other Asian countries, both in December 1997 and
in June 2000 the Philippines were exposed mainly to the United States, as were most Latin
American countries.
16 At the end of June 2000, the relative dependence of Latin American and
Asian and Pacic countries had strongly decreased, as these countries increased their share of
liabilities vis-à-vis other industrial countries (especially Germany and Spain). On the contrary,
for East European countries, loans from Germany have increased in relative terms, despite the
(small) decline in the ows of funds in absolute terms. In Q2 2000, six out of nine East
European countries in our sample raised their dependence on the common lender for Russia
and Ukraine, the weight of their external liabilities vis-à- v i sG e r m a n yp e a k e dt oo v e r5 0p e r
cent.
Absolute dependence shows a somewhat different picture. For the major Latin American
countries, liabilities vis-à-vis US banks in the crisis year were not particularly large given the
dimension of their economies (as measured by GDP). Liabilities vis-à-vis the main lender
were, instead, very important for Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia and Hungary – the
ratio between total external liabilities and GDP being greater than 10 per cent. In June 2000,
absolute dependence was still low in Latin America and had strongly decreased in the Asia
Pacic region. In East Europe, it had increased for most countries, and was still above 10 per
cent for Russia and Hungary.
Claims of the common lender vis-à-vis the economies of each area are shown in tables
5t o7 .T h erst measure, the relative exposure (
), is the ratio between the common lender’s
assets vis-à-vis country  and its total claims vis-à-vis developing countries. The second, the
absolute exposure (
), is the ratio between the common lender’s assets vis-à-vis country  and



















49 Taiwan is also an exception as in Q2 1997 it had a well distributed structure of liabilities, the weights of
its loans vis-à-vis the three main lenders being all equal to 12 per cent.27
where 
￿
￿ denotes the claims of country  vis-à-vis country  and, of course, 
￿
￿  ￿
￿.I nt h e
crisis year, the relative exposure of the common lender was a two-digit number for Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico, China, Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand and Russia. Interestingly, this set
of countries includes the three economies that were rst affected by nancial distress in each
episode. In particular, in the crisis year, the share of loans received by Mexico and Thailand,
respectively from US and Japanese banks, both amounted to 23 per cent of the claims of these
lenders vis-à-vis developing countries in Q2 1998, the share of German banks’ claims vis-à-
vis developing countries received by Russia was only slightly lower (19 per cent).
As for the absolute exposure, the picture in the crisis year was again much worse for
t h eA s i aP a c i c region with respect to Latin America and East Europe. For Indonesia, South
Korea, Thailand and Taiwan the exposure of the lender was a two-digit number in Latin
America there was no country for which the weight of claims from the US was so large and,
in East Europe, only claims vis-à-vis Russia were a large share in German banks’ assets.
5.2 # 	 
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Starting from the measures of borrowers’ dependence and lender’s exposure illustrated
above, one can construct different indexes of vulnerability to the common lender channel. For
instance, Caramazza et al. (2000) multiply the relative dependence of the borrower by the
relative exposure of the main lender vis-à-vis that borrower (Index CRS). For each emerging








￿ .( 1 )
This index suffers from two major inconveniencies. A rst weakness arises from the fact
that it is only based on relative ows. Note that the borrower’s relative dependence is high
when all its liabilities are due to a single country however, if these ows are negligible with
respect to the magnitude of the borrower’s economy, the dependence on the lender should also
be regarded as negligible. Thus a possible renement of the Index CRS consists in using the
absolute dependence instead of the relative dependence of the borrower vis-à-vis the common
lender. A similar reasoning applies to the common lender’s exposure. For instance, it might
well happen that the lender’s exposure remains unchanged in relative terms, whilst absolute28
ows increase signicantly. Of course the latter case entails a higher risk of contagion, since
it implies a larger expected loss for the lender in case of a crisis in  and, in turn, a higher
probability that capital adequacy requirements force the lender to retrench of its credit lines.
The second drawback of Index CRS is that it partially disregards the exposure of the
main lenders vis-à-vis the crisis economy. Note that in the Index CRS, the crisis economy is
used only to identify the common lender, which is dened as the country that lent the most to
the rst economy experiencing nancial turmoil. However, it must be mentioned that theory
suggests that the common-lender channel is active if two hypotheses hold: the exposure of the
lender vis-à-vis the  
 is large enough to imply an adjustment in its credit lines
the same lender is an important source of funding for many economies. While the latter is
taken into account by the measure of dependence, the former is neglected in the Index CRS.
Indeed, if the common lender holds a low share of claims vis-à-vis country ,I n d e xC R St e n d s
to be low (as the second factor on the right hand side of equation (1) is small) nevertheless,
a situation in which the common lender is highly exposed vis-à-vis a third country  entails a
high degree of vulnerability to contagion also for country : when asset prices collapse in ,
the common lender is likely to withdraw funds also from country .











So￿r￿r is the absolute exposure of the common lender vis-à-vis the rst country that
experiences the crisis.
Index 1 is composed of two factors: the rst differs among all developing countries (the
borrower’s dependence), the other varies among the main lenders. Hence, the comparison of
countries belonging to the same common lender cluster and of countries belonging to different
clusters is straightforward. Within clusters, differences are due only to the borrowers’ different
level of dependence on the common lender across clusters, they are also due to the different
concentration of common lenders’ assets.
Since the magnitude of the retrenchment of the credit lines from the common lender also
depends on the size of the likely rebalancing, a third factor could be introduced in the index of29











 for    (2)
This factor takes into account the fact that the amount of funds that will be cut from country
 is an increasing function in the amount of funds that the common lender provides to this
country and to the crisis country. Therefore, an index of vulnerability for country  that also












Anal consideration: Index CRS(as well as Indexes 1 and 2 hereproposed)is a measure
that requires the knowledge of the ‘ground zero’ country. It can then be constructed only #

 i.e., after the crisis has already erupted. In order to obtain an #
 indicator, the factors
in Indexes 1 and 2 that refer to the crisis economy may be referred to the country for which
the exposure of the common lender is the highest. The risk of transmission is, in fact, greatest
when the country that rst experiences the nancial turmoil is the most important debtor of the
common lender. In this case, the probability that the crisis will force the lender to re-adjust its
lines of credit is large, and thus the probability that the common lender channel of contagion
is enabled is high. Analytically, the #

















































Indexes 1 and 2 would probably overestimate the risks of contagion since they refer to the
worst scenario (the ground zero economy is the most dangerous for the diffusion of the crisis)30
but, for the same reason, they could also be more useful for a prudential assessment of the
phenomenon.
Tables 8 to 10 report the values of our #
 indexes and Index CRS for Latin
American,AsiaPacicandEastEuropeancountries, inthecrisisyearandin Q2 2000. Overall,
the results are somewhat different regarding both the magnitude and the ranking of countries’
vulnerability. In particular, note that the introduction of a measure of absolute dependence
in Index 1 reduces the level of vulnerability to contagion for countries like Brazil, China and
Russia, whose weight of external loans is small with respect to GDP vulnerability increases,
instead, for countries like Bolivia, Philippines, Malaysia and many East European countries,
which rely heavily on external funds.
In spite of the heterogeneity of the results, some main ndings can be singled out. First,
all indexes suggest that, in the crisis year, vulnerability was much higher in the Asia Pacic
region than in the other two areas. In particular, note that all indexes give the highest value
for Thailand in 1997, denoting the extreme vulnerability of the banking system in this country
to a withdrawal of funds from Japan. Second, it is interesting to note that in 1997, when
the intensity of the contagion following the devaluation of the Thai baht was most evident,
i n d e x e sg i v ev e r yl a r g ev a l u e sf o rf o u ro ft h eve countries most involved in the crisis. Here,
the Philippines are an exception, since liabilities of the banking system vis-à-vis Japan were
low, as the country was indebted mainly to the United States. Finally, according to all indexes,
vulnerability to this channel of contagion declined sharply in Q2 2000 with respect to the
crisis year for almost all the countries in our sample. This is probably due to both a more
even distribution of liabilities on the part of developing countries and a higher degree of
diversication in bank investments from the three main lending countries. Nevertheless, the
decline in vulnerability was particularly large for the Asian countries – as a result of the sharp
reduction of funds from Japan – and somewhat smaller for East European countries.
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The paper identies three main channels for the international transmission of nancial
shocks through the banking system. The rst channel hinges on the specic lending activity
of banks, and is connected with the value of collateral and capital adequacy requirements.
When the same institution is the main source of funding for several countries, the increase31
in non-performing loans following a nancial crisis in one of the borrowing economies may
induce the common lender to require early repayment of its outstanding credits elsewhere.
Similarly, the collapse of the value of debtors’ collateral may worsen their creditworthiness
and negatively affect the condence of international lenders.
The second channel of transmission is connected with the function of maturity
transformation, which leaves banks vulnerable to . The indeterminacy of equilibria in




 dueto a crisis ina foreigncountry mayinducedepositors in othercountries to switch froma
good to a bad equilibrium (sunspot) or to update their beliefs about the quality of other banks’





. In particular, the probability of a banking crisis increases with the share of
foreign-currency-denominated debt and the level of domestic and international interest rates,
and decreases with the maturity of capital inows. Moreover, in globally integrated nancial
markets, banks from different economies may form a network of rms (credit chain) through
which problems affecting a specic bank of a single country can be transmitted internationally.
Financial shocks can also spread because of moral hazard. The presence of implicit
or explicit insurance schemes, condence in international rescue packages or, simply, the
belief that some borrowers are too big to fail can provoke excessive capital inows that
banks eventually channel towards risky or unprotable plans. A banking crisis in a country
characterized by such a system of guarantees can undermine the condence of international
investors in the reliability of similar systems, triggering large capital outows and, eventually,
a nancial crisis in other countries.
The experience of the most recent crisis episodes suggests that, among others, the
presence of a common source of funding strongly favors the transmission of nancial shocks.
The paper proposes some indexes which measure the degrees of vulnerability to this channel.
Such measures do not require knowledge of the country rst affected by a negative shock
(ground zero country), allowing a useful ex-ante risk assessment. In addition, they facilitate
both cross-country and over-time comparisons. Focusing on the Mexican, Asian and Russian
crises, our analysis shows that the values of the indexes decreased sharply following each
crisis in the three areas involved, reecting a higher degree of diversication of the sources of32
funding in developing countries and a lower level of concentration of loans by the main lenders
(the US, Japan and Germany).
A statistical analysis of the predictive power of these kinds of indicator and their
contribution to more traditional sets of variables signaling the fragility of the nancial system
was beyond the scope of the present work. The empirical evidence reported so far is, however,
promising. Preliminary econometric studies reviewed in our work agree on the nding that
the probability of a currency crisis increases signicantly in the presence of a common lender.
Thus, a set of indicators of vulnerability of the nancial system should take into account the









United States Japan Germany
Region Q4 94 Q2 00 Q2 97 Q2 00 Q2 98 Q2 00
Latin America 32.2 24.1 6.0 3.9 13.7 13.2
Asia Pacic 12.4 10.5 35.7 24.3 12.5 15.8








Country Q4 94 Q2 00 Q4 94 Q2 00
Argentina 30.7 18.6 4.24 4.44
Bolivia 35.4 22.1 2.12 5.07
Brazil 29.6 26.4 2.73 2.76
Chile 31.6 20.4 7.69 5.92
Colombia 29.8 21.8 3.75 3.18
Mexico 38.5 29.6 5.92 3.05
Peru 16.5 14.8 1.01 3.24
Paraguay 13.0 10.5 1.30 1.16
Uruguay 36.5 25.1 7.28 5.65







Country Q2 97 Q2 00 Q2 97 Q2 00
China 36.0 21.9 2.30 1.25
Indonesia 41.7 29.2 11.3 6.24
India 22.8 15.6 1.03 0.65
Malaysia 37.5 34.3 10.8 7.05
Philippines 15.7 20.9 2.61 4.19
South Korea 33.4 24.1 7.30 3.00
Thailand 55.8 39.8 25.8 8.09






Country Q2 98 Q2 00 Q2 98 Q2 00
Bulgaria 33.2 25.7 3.79 2.46
Czech Rep. 43.4 44.5 8.78 8.23
Hungary 43.4 44.4 13.6 14.1
Poland 26.5 35.6 2.05 3.65
Romania 32.6 25.8 2.50 2.54
Russia 43.4 54.4 11.8 11.6
Slovak Rep. 27.5 25.9 7.53 6.12
Turkey 26.8 30.8 4.63 6.01
Ukraine 44.8 50.3 1.31 1.73
Table 5
+ BA+ >CDC> 	
 		
Relative Absolute
C o u n t r y Q 4 9 4Q 2 0 0Q 4 9 4Q 2 0 0
Argentina 10.1 10.6 3.52 2.71
Bolivia 0.12 0.37 0.04 0.09
Brazil 13.8 14.7 4.80 3.75
Chile 3.62 3.78 1.26 0.96
Colombia 2.77 2.25 0.96 0.57
Mexico 23.0 14.6 8.01 3.73
Peru 0.47 1.61 0.16 0.41
Paraguay 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.02
Urugay 1.18 1.08 0.41 0.28
Venezuela 4.29 3.23 1.49 0.82Table 6
-	A	
 BA+ >CDC> 		 A	
Relative Absolute
Country Q2 97 Q2 00 Q2 97 Q2 00
China 12.4 14.9 12.9 4.61
Indonesia 14.6 13.1 15.2 4.05
India 2.55 3.62 2.66 1.12
Malaysia 6.42 6.68 6.70 2.06
Philippines 1.41 3.61 1.47 1.11
South Korea 20.7 16.4 21.6 5.05
Thailand 23.0 12.9 24.0 3.97




 BA+ >CDC> 	 +A
Relative Absolute
Country Q2 98 Q2 00 Q2 98 Q2 00
Bulgaria 0.26 0.19 0.24 0.16
Czech Rep. 2.78 2.41 2.54 2.09
Hungary 3.65 4.14 3.33 3.60
Poland 1.86 3.58 1.70 3.11
Romania 0.59 0.40 0.54 0.35
R u s s i a 1 8 . 71 3 . 91 7 . 01 2 . 1
Slovak Rep. 0.87 0.73 0.80 0.63
Turkey 5.22 7.54 4.76 6.55





I n d e xC R S I n d e x1 I n d e x2
Country Q4 94 Q2 00 Q2 97 Q2 00 Q2 98 Q2 00
Argentina 311 198 33.9 16.6 4.46 2.07
Bolivia 4.2 8.1 17.0 19.0 0.03 0.08
Brazil 408 389 21.9 10.3 3.92 1.77
Chile 114 77 61.6 22.2 2.90 0.98
Colombia 82 49 30.0 11.9 1.08 0.31
Mexico 887 433 28.4 11.4 7.59 1.96
Peru 7.7 24 8.1 12.1 0.49 0.23
Paraguay 1.2 0.8 10.4 4.3 0.01 0.01
Uruguay 43 27 58.3 21.2 0.89 0.27





I n d e xC R S I n d e x1 I n d e x2
Country Q4 94 Q2 00 Q2 97 Q2 00 Q2 98 Q2 00
China 444 327 55 6.3 8.85 1.13
Indonesia 607 383 272 32 51.5 4.94
India 58 56 25 3.3 0.82 0.14
Malaysia 240 229 258 36 21.6 2.84
Philippines 22 75 63 21 1.14 0.91
South Korea 689 393 175 14 47.0 2.66
Thailand 1282 511 556 41 161 6.27




Index CRS Index 1 Index 2
C o u n t r y Q 4 9 4Q 2 0 0Q 2 9 7Q 2 0 0Q 2 9 8Q 2 0 0
Bulgaria 8.8 4.8 65 30 0.21 0.07
Czech Rep. 121 107 150 100 5.12 2.78
Hungary 158 184 231 171 10.4 8.23
Poland 49 127 35 44 0.80 1.83
R o m a n i a 1 91 04 33 10 . 3 1 0 . 1 4
Russia 811 757 56 76 11.1 11.4
Slovak Rep. 24 19 128 74 1.38 0.62
Turkey 140 232 79 73 5.06 6.37
U k r a i n e1 71 42 22 10 . 1 1 0 . 0 7#
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